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ENGAGING WITH ABDULLAHI AN-NA‘IM’S PHILOSOPHY
ON ISLAM AND HUMAN RIGHTS
Mashood A. Baderin*
ABSTRACT
Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na‘im is one of the leading scholars and contributors
on the subject of Islam and human rights. In fact, he remains one of the most
cited authorities in the subject area. His contributions on the subject span more
than three decades during which he has engaged with almost every topical issue
on the subject. He has been described as one of the non-Western jurists from
“the South” “who ha[s] made substantial contributions to the theory and
practice of human rights” generally.1
There can be little doubt that Abdullahi An-Na‘im has been one of the most
influential voices on the issue of Islam and Human Rights.2

*
Professor of Laws, SOAS University of London. Professor Baderin is an expert in the fields of Islamic
Law, International and Comparative Human Rights Law, Public International Law, and Human Rights & Islamic
Law. His research and teaching focus on the interaction between International Law, Human Rights Law, and
Islamic Law in Muslim states. In 2012, he was appointed as an Independent Expert on the Situation of Human
Rights in the Sudan by the U.N. Human Rights Council. Professor Baderin has authored and edited a number of
books and contributed numerous articles and book chapters to collections. For more information and a list of
publications, please visit https://www.soas.ac.uk/staff/staff30601.php.
1
Mashood A. Baderin, Introduction to ISLAM AND HUMAN RIGHTS: SELECTED ESSAYS OF ABDULLAHI
AN-NA‘IM xiii (Mashood A. Baderin ed., 2010) [hereinafter ISLAM AND HUMAN RIGHTS].
2
Malcolm Evans, Collected Essays in Law: Abdullahi An-Na‘im: Islam and Human Rights, 13
ECCLESIASTICAL L.J. 111, 111 (2011).
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INTRODUCTION
As a contribution to this Festschrift in honor of Professor Abdullahi Ahmed
An-Na‘im’s scholarship, I intend in this Article to revisit and expand on the
analysis in my previous essay entitled Abdullahi An-Na‘im’s Philosophy on
Islam and Human Rights,3 from which the first quotation above is taken. That
essay was the introduction to a selection of An-Na‘im’s articles published within
the book Islam and Human Rights: Selected Essays of Abdullahi An-Na‘im.4 I
indicated then that, as an introductory essay, the essay was not intended to be a
critical analysis nor a critique of An-Na‘im’s articles, but rather “to present[] the
work ‘as it is’[] [by] providing a brief summary of each of the essays contained
in the volume and identifying in the process, what I consider to be the main
elements of his general philosophy on the subject.”5 Since the book’s publication
over eleven years ago, this essay has been widely read and well-received.
Malcolm Evans, for example, noted in his review of the publication that “the
introduction by Mashood Baderin is a masterful overview of the work of AnNa‘im as presented in these Essays and it deserves to be recognised as a
significant contribution to scholarship in its own right.”6
I have used that essay, in the past eleven years, as one of the readings for
two postgraduate modules, “Human Rights and Islamic Law” and “Islamic
Law,” which I teach separately at the SOAS School of Law at the University of
London, and the essay has attracted interesting, scholarly classroom discussions
from students on each of the modules every year. That in itself re-affirms the
point I made in the essay that An-Na‘im remains one of the leading authorities
3
4
5
6

Baderin, supra note 1.
See id.
Id. at xiv.
Evans, supra note 2, at 111–12.
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on Islam and human rights as he has written on almost every topical issue on the
subject, and his scholarship cannot be ignored. Today, it is rare to read any
scholarly publication on Islam and human rights without it citing one or another
of his publications. The classroom discussions stimulated by that essay have
often gone beyond the sixteen articles covered in the essay, which referenced
relevant publications such as his earlier book Toward an Islamic Reformation:
Civil Liberties, Human Rights, and International Law,7 his later book Islam and
the Secular State: Negotiating the Future of Shari’a,8 and his article The
Compatibility Dialectic: Mediating the Legitimate Coexistence of Islamic Law
and State Law,9 amongst others. Based on those classroom discussions, I will,
in this Article, engage reflectively with An-Na‘im’s philosophy on Islam and
human rights as identified in the previous essay. But in doing so, I am both
conscious of his colossal authority on the subject and of the fact, as rightly noted
by Daniel Philpott, that one would engage with An-Na‘im’s work “only in the
sense that one probes the work of [an] intellectual giant.”10 Thus, in this Article
I will be referring to and quoting from his other relevant publications to provide
a lucid perspective of the issues.
In my analysis of the selected sixteen journal articles in that introductory
essay, I identified An-Na‘im’s general philosophy on Islam and human rights:
I have endeavoured to identify Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im’s general
philosophy on Islam and human rights as a three-angled philosophy,
namely: (i) the philosophy for cross-cultural universality of human
rights, (ii) the philosophy for internal reformation of Islamic law based
on the methodology of his mentor Ustadh Mahmoud Mohamed Taha,
and (iii) the philosophy for re-affirming secularism for Muslim states.
Based on this three-angled philosophy, An-Na’im advocates a theory
of interdependence between Islam, human rights and secularism
through which he believes that Muslims should be able to practice their
religion faithfully and at the same time enjoy the guarantees of human
rights without hindrance.11

It is important to keep this general underlying objective of An-Na‘im in mind
while reflecting over his three-angled philosophy on the subject.
7
ABDULLAHI AHMED AN-NA‘IM, TOWARD AN ISLAMIC REFORMATION: CIVIL LIBERTIES, HUMAN
RIGHTS, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (1990).
8
ABDULLAHI AHMED AN-NA‘IM, ISLAM AND THE SECULAR STATE: NEGOTIATING THE FUTURE OF
SHARI’A (2008).
9
Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na‘im, The Compatibility Dialectic: Mediating the Legitimate Coexistence of
Islamic Law and State Law, 73 MOD. L. REV. 1 (2010).
10
Daniel Philpott, Arguing with An-Na‘im, IMMANENT FRAME (July 14, 2008), https://tif.ssrc.org/2008/
07/14/arguing-with-an-Na‘im.
11
Baderin, supra note 1, at xxxviii.
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In expanding on my previous essay, this Article will highlight and respond
to four main critiques that have constantly arisen in classroom discussions over
the years on each aspect of his three-angled philosophy. These include the
following: (i) whether An-Na‘im’s concept of “cross-cultural universality” of
human rights is distinguishable from the contested traditional concept of
“cultural relativism” in human rights discourse; (ii) the effect of An-Na‘im’s
non-distinction between “shari’ah” and “fiqh” in his analysis of classical Islamic
law; (iii) the viability of the concept of “reverse naskh” for the internal
reformation of Islamic law; and (iv) the effect of using “civic reason” to validate
the role of Islamic principles as part of public law. In engaging with these issues,
I will make reference to relevant literature in which similar questions have been
raised by other scholars on the subject.
I.

DISCUSSING AN-NA‘IM’S PHILOSOPHY OF CROSS-CULTURAL
UNIVERSALITY OF HUMAN RIGHTS

In my previous essay, I contextualized An-Na‘im’s philosophy of crosscultural universality of human rights by referring mainly to his 1994 essay titled
What Do We Mean by Universal?12 in which he articulated his views on the
universality of human rights in relation to Islam. I identified, inter alia, that:
An-Na’im is certainly a universalist and a staunch believer in the
universal nature of human rights as is reflected in the first paragraph
of this essay where he states that “[h]uman rights ought, by definition,
to be universal in concept, scope and content as well as in application:
a globally accepted set of rights or claims to which all human beings
are entitled by virtue of their humanity and without distinction on
grounds such as race, gender or religion” (p. 120). He also notes,
however, that “[y]et there can be no prospect of the universal
application of such rights unless there is, at least, substantial agreement
on their concept, scope and content” (p. 121). Thus, his philosophy on
the universality of human rights, as he manifests in this essay and
consistently restates at appropriate points in all his other writings, is
what may be described as a philosophy of cross-cultural universality.
I identify this as the first element of his general philosophy on Islam
and human rights. In relation to Islam, he reflects this philosophy of
cross-cultural universality in the last paragraph of the essay wherein
he concludes that “There are potentially powerful and vigorous
constituencies for universal human rights worldwide – including the
Islamic world. But those constituencies can never be mobilised in a

12
Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na‘im, What Do We Mean by Universal?, 23 INDEX ON CENSORSHIP 120 (1994),
reprinted in ISLAM AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 120–28.
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global project on purely Western liberal notions of individual civil and
political rights. Along with other rights and new formulations of
familiar rights, all human rights will only command genuine universal
respect and validity through discourse and dialogue” (p. 128). Between
the first paragraph earlier quoted and this last paragraph of the essay,
An-Na’im clearly articulates his views on the different paradoxes
raised by the question of universality in theory and practice. He
emphasises throughout the essay that the dialogue for cross-cultural
universality must be “undertaken in good faith, with mutual respect
for, and sensitivity to, the integrity and fundamental concerns of
respective cultures, with an open mind and with the recognition that
existing formulations may be changed – or even abolished – in the
process” (p. 122).13

The cross-cultural universality of human rights is a core philosophy in AnNa‘im’s general human rights scholarship and advocacy for social change. Apart
from its manifestation in his earlier works,14 he continues to advance the need
for a cross-cultural universality of human rights variously in all his recent works.
He indicated his motivation for this philosophy in the introduction to the 1992
book Human Rights in Cross-Cultural Perspectives: A Quest for Consensus. He
stated: “Without underestimating the value of other possible approaches . . . a
cross-cultural approach may be helpful in deepening our understanding of the
underlying causes of the continuing discrepancy between theory and practice of
human rights, and in addressing those causes more effectively.”15 He noted
further that “the credibility and practical efficacy of national and international
human rights standards would be enhanced by increasing their legitimacy in the
widest possible range of cultural traditions.”16 He reflected his continued
adherence to this philosophy in several sections of his 2008 book Islam and the
Secular State, noting emphatically that human rights “can work only when they
enjoy sufficient cultural and religious legitimacy”17 and that a failure to adapt
the universal principles of human rights to local conditions “can also lead to
varying degrees of difficulty or ease of correction.”18 This point is reiterated in
his most recent 2021 book Decolonizing Human Rights, in which he “proposes
13

Baderin, supra note 1, at xvi (citing and quoting An-Na‘im, supra note 12, at 120, 121, 122, 128).
See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA: CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES (Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na‘im
& Francis M. Deng eds., 1990); HUMAN RIGHTS IN CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES: A QUEST FOR CONSENSUS
(Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na‘im ed., 1992); Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na‘im, Toward a Cross-Cultural Approach to
Defining International Standards of Human Rights: The Meaning of Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, in HUMAN RIGHTS: AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL READER 68–85 (Mark Goodale ed., 2009).
15
HUMAN RIGHTS IN CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES: A QUEST FOR CONSENSUS, supra note 14, at 2.
16
Id.
17
AN-NA‘IM, supra note 8, at 44.
18
Id. at 138.
14
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advancing the universality of human rights through internal discourse within the
Islamic and African societies and cross-cultural dialogue among human
cultures.”19 Despite the astuteness of this philosophy, however, it has not
escaped critique from human rights scholars and ardent advocates of
unconditional universality of human rights. Rhoda Howard, for example, has
argued against what she has described as “the enterprise of surveying world
cultures and religions in order to establish a consensus on human rights[.]”20
The main critique against the cross-cultural universality of human rights is
that this philosophy is perceived as evocating the traditional cultural relativist
argument that has been contested vigorously by ardent universalist human rights
scholars and advocates over the years, due to its perceived tendency to
undermine the universality of human rights. Such contestation is based on the
fact that universality is considered to be at the heart of international human rights
scholarship and advocacy. As I noted in my previous essay, “[t]he usual starting
point of human rights discourse is the question of its universality[,]” and the title
of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights “clearly indicates that the
international human rights agenda was meant to be a universal one from the
beginning.”21 Thus, in my Human Rights and Islamic Law class discussions on
this philosophy of cross-cultural universality, many “ardent universalists”
among the students often query whether there is any practical difference between
this concept of cross-cultural universality and the traditional concept of cultural
relativism in international human rights discourse. In my view, while both
concepts reflect the need to acknowledge the cultural difference in the universal
application of human rights, there is some degree of difference between them
that needs to be directly addressed due, particularly, to the acknowledged, agelong academic controversies surrounding the scope of cultural relativism in
human rights scholarship.22
As I have noted before:
The theory of cultural relativism is . . . advocated mostly by
non-Western States and scholars who contend that human rights are
not exclusively rooted in Western culture, but are inherent in human
nature and based on morality. Thus, human rights, they claim, cannot
be interpreted without regard to the cultural differences of peoples.

19

ABDULLAHI AHMED AN-NA‘IM, DECOLONIZING HUMAN RIGHTS i (2021).
Rhoda E. Howard, Dignity, Community, and Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN CROSS-CULTURAL
PERSPECTIVES: A QUEST FOR CONSENSUS, supra note 14, at 81, 99.
21
Baderin, supra note 1, at xv.
22
See, e.g., Jack Donnelly, Cultural Relativism and Universal Human Rights, 6 HUM. RTS. Q. 400 (1984).
20
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Advocates of cultural relativism assert that “rights and rules about
morality are encoded in and thus depend on cultural contexts.”23

The concern of most ardent universalists is that “the theory of cultural relativism
is prone to abuse and may be used to rationalize human rights violations by
different regimes[]” as “[i]t admits of pluralistic inputs, which, if not properly
managed, can debase the efficacy of human rights.”24 An-Na‘im obviously
appreciates and has responded variously to this legitimate concern against
cultural relativism by noting that “[t]he critics of cultural relativism perceive it
as undermining the ability to condemn repressive practices in other countries
that are sanctioned by the particular culture. For example, some scholars have
charged that relativism provides a notion that can [even] be used to justify
slavery and genocide.”25 While he concedes that “[t]here is certainly substance
to this criticism if one believes cultural relativism implies the complete tolerance
of all norms and practices sanctioned by the respective cultures.”26 He however
mitigates that concern by reference, inter alia, to Jack Donnelly’s typology of
cultural relativisms27 to the effect that “[c]laims of cultural relativism show a
great diversity in meaning, substance, and importance.”28 Thus, he reaches the
conclusion that “[c]ultural relativism does not necessarily require allowing
cultures total autonomy in accepting a given human right as culturally legitimate
or rejecting it as culturally illegitimate[;]”29 rather, “the basic premise of
international efforts to protect and promote human rights is the belief that there
are limits on cultural relativism.”30
Also, in the introductory chapter to the 1990 edited volume Human Rights
in Africa: Cross-Cultural Perspectives, An-Na‘im and Francis Deng
acknowledged academic critiques of the cross-cultural perspective, which
apparently stem from the pessimism for cultural relativism. They noted that
“[s]ome people . . . think that this approach actually retards the evolution of
international standards[]” based on the argument that “the cultural approach
fosters a relativism that is opposed to universalism, whether it is because of a
23

MASHOOD A. BADERIN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND ISLAMIC LAW 27 (2003).
Id.
25
Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na‘im, Problems of Universal Cultural Legitimacy for Human Rights, in
HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA: CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 14, at 340.
26
Id.
27
See Donnelly, supra note 22, at 401 (classifying cultural relativism into two main types—namely, (i)
strong cultural relativism and (ii) weak cultural relativism—but noting that “[a]cross the continuum of strong
and weak relativisms there are several levels and types of relativity[]”).
28
HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA: CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 14, at 342 (quoting Donnelly,
supra note 22, at 410).
29
Id. at 343.
30
Id.
24
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sincere commitment to local cultures and traditions or a purposeful manipulative
effort to justify violations of human rights at the local or national level.”31 They
then noted that although the contributors to that volume
all say they would like to see the countries of the world adopt
international standards for the protection of human rights[,] [t]he
problem is that most of them have mixed feelings about the proper role
of the various cultural traditions in this regard, largely because they
feel that the assertiveness of these traditions acts as a force that casts
doubt on the universal validity of international standards.32

Reflectively, it can be established that there is some degree of theoretical
difference between the concept of cross-cultural universality of human rights
and the concept of cultural relativism in human rights. To avoid mere conjecture
about An-Na‘im’s current perspectives on this critique, I raised this point in my
discussion with him while writing this Article. He noted that this question is
actually the subject of his most recent book, Decolonizing Human Rights, the
core point of which is that every human being is a cultural relativist, including
all liberal universalists, because there is no culturally-neutral human rights.33
The question is therefore how to include all cultural perspectives instead of
assuming that “liberal relativism” is the exclusive standard by which all
perspectives are judged. In Decolonizing Human Rights, An-Na‘im challenges
what he describes as “liberal relativism pretending to be global universalism[]”34
and engages with what he describes as “the inevitable paradox of the universality
of human rights project, on the one hand, and relativity of every cultural,
ideological, or geographical premise or rationale of the international protection
of these rights, on the other.”35 He suggests cross-cultural dialogue as the
paradigm for resolving this paradox, stating the following:
The choice I am suggesting is between no protection under the liberal
relativism of the current international legal system, or some degree of
possible protection under the proposed indigenous formation of human
rights. Though it remains possible for such formations of human rights
to achieve universality, this will be a gradual and incremental process,
occurring through what I call internal discourse and cross-cultural
dialogue.36

31
32
33
34
35
36

Id. at 1.
Id.
See generally AN-NA‘IM, supra note 19.
Id. at 37.
Id. at 103.
Id. at 102–03.
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Thus, An-Na‘im’s philosophy of cross-cultural universality of human rights
apparently seeks to mediate the paradox of the universality of human rights
project on the basis that “[a]ny concept of human rights that is to be universally
accepted and globally enforced demands equal respect and mutual
comprehension between rival cultures[.]”37
I have adduced a similar argument, describing the situation as the “paradox
of universalism and cultural relativism[.]”38 I have also noted:
The present theory of universalism is itself . . . criticized as being
culturally relative to Western values. That is the paradox, whereby
the controversy between universalism and cultural relativism
actually portrays a situation of cultural relativisms.
....
. . . This calls for a multicultural or cross-cultural approach
to the interpretation of and application of the international human
rights principles in a manner that will not reduce its efficacy but
lead to the realization of an inclusive theory of universalism.39
Bassam Tibi also conveyed similar thinking by distinguishing “cultural
pluralism” from “cultural relativism.” Tibi stated: “Being committed to cultural
pluralism and opposed to cultural relativism, [he] share[s] this view [of crosscultural university], provided we can reach a universal consensus on the basic
human rights shared by different cultures.”40 Thus, the philosophy of crosscultural universality advocates for “cultural pluralism,” which is both inward
and outward looking, in the universality of human rights. This stands in contrast
to the concept of “cultural relativism,” which is only inward looking. This
philosophy would involve a cultural dialogue of human rights values, in which
all cultures would have a right to participate, contribute, and convince rationally
on any cultural value brought into the dialogue. Unlike cultural relativism, crosscultural universality calls for “an objective evaluation of what every civilization
can contribute to universalism in international human rights law. Presumptions
of cultural inferiority must be avoided and justifications on cultural differences
must be examined . . . within . . . human dignity with a view to evolving an
inclusive universalism in international human rights law.”41 With regard to
37
An-Na‘im, supra note 12, at 120; see also Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na‘im, Universality of Human Rights:
An Islamic Perspective, in JAPAN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE 311, 314–319 (Nisuke
Ando ed., 1999).
38
BADERIN, supra note 23, at 26.
39
Id. at 28.
40
Bassam Tibi, The European Tradition of Human Rights and the Culture of Islam, in HUMAN RIGHTS
IN AFRICA: CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 14, at 109.
41
BADERIN, supra note 23, at 28.
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Islamic law, the necessary question to then ask is as follows (as I indicated in
the previous essay):
But what kind of contribution can Islam bring to this dialogue
towards the realisation of a cross-cultural universality of human
rights? An-Na’im identifies that in “[r]eading the Qur’an and Sunna,
one will find authority for liberalism as well as conservatism, and
Muslim history gives clear examples of both tendencies”. This matter,
he argues “is determined by the choices Muslims make, and the
struggle they wage in favour of their choices, in their own historical
context” . . . . Thus, for Islam to be able to make a meaningful
contribution to the dialogue for cross-cultural universality of human
rights, Muslims must, in the view of An-Na’im, choose liberal
interpretations of Islamic sources to make Islamic law amenable to
modern international relations and human rights.42

Thus, for Islam’s constructive contribution to the cross-cultural universality
of human rights, An-Na‘im advances the need for internal reform, making the
pragmatic argument that it is imperative for Muslims to choose liberal and
human rights-friendly interpretations of Islamic sources. Through the adoption
of such liberal and tolerant perceptions of Islamic teachings, Muslims would be
able to practice their religion faithfully and at the same time enjoy the guarantee
of human rights without hindrance or rivalry between the two values, which is
the general underlying objective of An-Na‘im’s philosophy on Islam and human
rights. This perception is similar to Habermas’s presentation of law and morals
as being aligned and not rival concepts in his discourse theory on human rights.43
Other contemporary Muslim scholars have espoused comparable views on
the need for contextual and evolutionary interpretations of Islamic sources to
respond constructively to contemporary global challenges, such as the
promotion and protection of human rights. For example, I have argued that in
choosing between the different possible interpretations of Islamic law, the
political and legal authorities in Muslim-majority states should “exercise their
authority on the basis of the ‘liberal’ Islamic theological/juristic opinions that
would enhance good governance and human rights of the populace.”44

42

Baderin, supra note 1, at xvi–xvii.
See Jeffrey Flynn, Habermas on Human Rights: Law, Morality, and Intercultural Dialogue, 29 SOC.
THEORY & PRAC. 431 (2003); JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A
DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY (William Rehg trans., 1996).
44
Mashood A. Baderin, An Analysis of the Relationship Between Shari’a and Secular Democracy and
the Compatibility of Islamic Law with the European Convention on Human Rights, in ISLAM AND ENGLISH LAW:
RIGHTS, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND THE PLACE OF SHARI’A 89 (Robin Griffith-Jones ed., 2013).
43
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A similar view has been advanced by Khaled Abou El Fadl in his 2007 book
The Great Theft: Wrestling Islam from the Extremists, wherein he observed
notably that:
[m]odernity embodies pervasive and insistent universalisms such as
human rights, self-determination, prohibitions on the use of force,
basic rights for women, and ethnic, national, and religious rights;
complex global economic systems; and many other international
institutions that compose the structure of our modern world. Unless
religions can contribute to and enrich human life in decisive and clear
ways within this existing universal structure, religion will either be
forced to the sidelines of history, or be forced into a confrontation with
the powers of modernity—powers that will often be violent and
destructive.45

He then also proposed the need for internal reform of Islamic law, but noted that
“[m]any Muslims are offended by . . . reform because they wrongly believe that
this implies that Islam is somehow faulty or incomplete. But reform is not about
correcting God; reform is about improving our relationship with God, and about
better serving the trust that has been given to us.”46 He continued, “In other
words, the critical reflection that I am calling for is about, first, reassessing . . .
our understanding of the nature of the trust placed in us by God; and second,
once we develop a conception of that trust, assessing whether we are doing our
duties toward that trust.”47 He then identified two main approaches in that
regard, namely, “the puritan” and “the moderate,” noting that “[t]he issue that
confronts most Muslims right now is: As to the two opposite poles that currently
exist, to which pole do they wish to direct their faith?”48
To answer that question from An-Na‘im’s perspective, the right way is for
Muslims to adopt a modern, moderate, civil, rational, kinder, and gentler
interpretation of the Islamic sources, to enable them to confront modern global
challenges such as the universality of human rights. While a general agreement
about the need to promote a more compassionate and benevolent understanding
of Islamic law can be deciphered amongst most contemporary Muslim jurists,
especially in this “emerging post-modern period of Islamic law[,]”49 the more
difficult task is in reconciling the differences in the approaches and
methodologies for achieving that. This task serves as the basis for exploring An-

45
46
47
48
49

KHALED ABOU EL FADL, THE GREAT THEFT: WRESTLING ISLAM FROM THE EXTREMISTS 282 (2007).
Id. at 283.
Id. at 283–84.
Id. at 284.
MASHOOD A. BADERIN, ISLAMIC LAW: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 17–18 (2021).
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Na‘im’s philosophy of internal reformation of Islamic law, as will be discussed
below.
II. DISCUSSING AN-NA‘IM’S PHILOSOPHY OF INTERNAL REFORMATION OF
ISLAMIC LAW
Although An-Na‘im had advanced the need for an internal reformation of
Islamic law in earlier works, his 1990 book Toward an Islamic Reformation is
his major work which sets out in detail his philosophy of internal reformation of
Islamic law. There, he noted the decline in the application of Islamic public law
in most parts of the Muslim world since the late-nineteenth century due to
Western influence.50 However, from the late-twentieth century almost all
Muslim states started “experiencing rising demands for a stronger Islamic
identity and greater application of Shari’a.”51 He then identified the need for
such demands “to be reconciled with the realities of the nation-state and the
international order of the late twentieth century and with the expectations of the
Muslims themselves to enjoy the benefits of modern notions of constitutionalism
and human rights.”52 An-Na‘im is a pioneer in this regard, arguing that due to
the failure of earlier attempts at reforming Islamic law based on “the historical
conception and formulation of Shari’a[,]” there was a need to develop a “new
version of public law of Shari’a” for modern Muslim-majority states.53
Consequently, he boldly asserted in that work that “[i]t is my thesis that as long
as Muslims continue to adhere to the framework of historical Shari’a, they will
never achieve the necessary degree of reform which would make Islamic public
law workable today.”54 Apparently, his emphasis on Islamic public law
(mu’āmalāt) is due to the fact that traditionally, the impact of modern
constitutionalism and human rights law is mostly in the area of public law within
domestic systems as applied by the state.55
He made it clear that his call for a “new version of public law of Shari’a”
was to be based on an internal reform through modern re-interpretation of the
Islamic sources and not by secularization. In my previous essay, I contextualized

50

AN-NA‘IM, supra note 7, at 33.
Id.
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
Id. at 34.
55
However, human rights law has continued to seep slowly and incrementally into areas of private law.
See, e.g., Daniel Friedmann & Daphne Barak-Erez, Introduction to HUMAN RIGHTS IN PRIVATE LAW (Daniel
Friedmann & Daphne Barak-Erez eds., 2001).
51
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this philosophy by reference mainly to his 1987 essay Islamic Law, International
Relations, and Human Rights: Challenge and Response,56 noting that:
An-Na’im proposes “solutions to the drawbacks of historical Shari’a
from a religious rather than secular perspective, because Muslims do
not separate the religion of Islam from the law of Islam” (p. 318). He
argues here that a reformation of Islamic law through a modern
interpretation of the Shari’a would work better for the advancement of
human rights in Muslim states than a secular approach. He observes,
inter alia, in that regard that “because Shari’a signifies the positive
law of historical Islam, its general principles continue to bind and
motivate Muslims” (p. 319) and that the appeal of the Shari’a amongst
the majority of Muslims makes it imperative for it to be
“authoritatively reformed from within the Islamic traditions and in
ways acceptable to Muslims themselves, [o]therwise, such reform
would lack legitimacy and practical viability” (p. 319). He also notes,
however, that “although Muslims will not accept secular reforms to
their religious law and practice, they have made some concessions to
the demands of constitutionalism and the rule of law in national and
international relations” (p. 319). He summarizes his arguments in this
essay to the effect that “for Islamic states, smooth and successful
transition to complete secularism is neither likely nor desirable
because Muslims are obligated to live in accordance with Islamic law”
(p. 320). However, in his view, “[f]ulfilling that obligation by reintroducing historical Shari’a would be disastrous for international
relations and human rights” (p. 320). He therefore proposes that “the
Muslims’ religious duty may be satisfied by applying modern version
of Islamic law that is consistent with peaceful international relations
and respect for human rights” and that “[t]his modern version will
[still] be Islamic Shari’a because it will be derived from the
fundamental sources of Islam, without being identical in every respect
to historical Shari’a” (p. 320).
. . . But he also argues conversely that “[w]hile this Article
criticizes historical public Shari’a as being inconsistent with
prevailing human rights standards, it does not unqualifiedly endorse
those standards that originated with the western liberal tradition” (p.
332). Rather he proposes solutions from within Islam, stating that a
“legitimate and lasting constitutional and legal order that can address
modern international relations and domestic human rights must
develop from within Islam” (p. 333), for which he argues that the best
solution must be based on the methodology of his late mentor Ustadh
Mahmoud Mohamed Taha, who was executed in Sudan in 1985 for the
alleged offence of apostasy under Sudanese law then. An-Na’im
56
Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na‘im, Islamic Law, International Relations, and Human Rights: Challenge and
Response, 20 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 317 (1987), reprinted in ISLAM AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 1.
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consistently proposes Ustadh Mahmoud Taha’s methodology as the
best means of transforming Islamic law to meet the standards of
modern human rights and international relations in all his essays
contained herein as well as in his other major works on the subject.
This may be described as the philosophy of internal reformation of
Islamic law based on the methodology of his mentor Ustadh Mahmoud
Mohamed Taha, which I identify as the second element of his general
philosophy on Islam and human rights.
An-Na’im’s proposition for the internal reformation of Islamic
law is taken further in [his] essay, “A Kinder, Gentler Islam?” first
published in 1991. In this essay, he argues essentially for a kinder,
gentler interpretation of the Islamic sources.
In An-Na’im’s view it is possible, indeed imperative, “to
develop a new version of Shari’a based on a modern interpretation of
the sources of Islam” (p. 11) in ways that would promote a kinder,
gentler Islam. He states: “Far from advocating the abandonment of the
Islamic tradition, I am calling on Muslims to achieve their own
“reformation” in order to transform their tradition into a viable and just
ideology for their modern exercise of their right to self-determination”
(p. 11). He then goes on to elaborate on his proposed methodology of
transforming this tradition, which is again the methodology of his late
mentor Ustadh Mahmoud Mohamed Taha.57

This advocated approach of Ustadh Mahmoud is what may be described as
the concept of reverse naskh (abrogation), which An-Na‘im discussed in detail
in Toward an Islamic Reformation.58 The approach is based on the teachings of
Ustadh Mahmoud as mainly explained in the book The Second Message of
Islam, which was translated into the English language by An-Na‘im in 1987.59
He summarized the approach as follows:
The basic premise of Ustadh Mahmoud is that a close examination of
the content of the Qur’an and Sunna reveals two levels or stages of the
message of Islam, one of the earlier Mecca period and the other of the
subsequent Medina stage. Furthermore, he maintained that the earlier
message of Mecca is in fact the eternal and fundamental message of
Islam, emphasizing the inherent dignity of all human beings,
regardless of gender, religious belief, race, and so forth. That message

57
Baderin, supra note 1, at xvii–xix (citing An-Na‘im, supra note 54, at 318, 319, 320, 332, 333;
Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na‘im, The Islamic Law of Apostasy and Its Modern Applicability: A Case from the Sudan,
16 RELIGION 197 (1996), reprinted in ISLAM AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 1; Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na‘im,
A Kinder, Gentler Islam?, 52 TRANSITION 4 (1991), reprinted in ISLAM AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 1, at
11).
58
See AN-NA‘IM, supra note 7.
59
MAHMOUD MOHAMED TAHA, THE SECOND MESSAGE OF ISLAM (Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na‘im trans.,
1987).
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was characterized by equality between men and women and complete
freedom of choice in matters of religion and faith.
When that superior level of the message was violently and
irrationally rejected and it was practically demonstrated that society at
large was not yet ready for its implementation, the more realistic
message of the Medina stage was provided and implemented. In this
way, aspects of the message of the Mecca period which were
inappropriate for practical implementation within the historical
context of the seventh century were suspended and replaced [by the
founding Islamic law jurists through the process of naskh with] the
more practical principles revealed and implemented during the Medina
stage. Ustdah Mahmoud, however, maintained that the suspended
aspects of the Mecca message were not lost forever as a source of law.
Rather, they were postponed for implementation under appropriate
circumstances in the future.
....
. . . Ustadh Mahmoud proposed the evolution of the basis of
Islamic law from the texts of the Medina stage to that of the earlier
Mecca period. In other words, the evolutionary principle of
interpretation is nothing more than reversing the process of naskh or
abrogation so that those texts which were abrogated in the past can be
enacted into law now, with the consequent abrogation of texts that used
to be enacted as Shari’a. Verses that used to be enacted as Shari’a shall
be repealed, and verses that used to be repealed shall be enacted as
modern Islamic law. Since this proposal would found modern
principles of public law on one class of Qur’an and Sunna texts as
opposed to another class of those texts, the resultant body of law would
be as Islamic as Shari’a has been. . . . I submit that a system of public
law based on the Qur’an and Sunna, albeit “not necessarily the
classical medieval Shari’a,” would be the modern “Shari’a.”60

While the concept of reverse naskh is certainly novel and bold, it has
received a mixed academic reaction, with some commentators commending the
concept as a unique and welcome attempt toward the internal reform of Islamic
law, and some commentators, notably Muslims, critiquing the concept as nonsustainable for different reasons. In his foreword to An-Na‘im’s book, John Voll
expressed the view that the concept provides “an alternative to both the
secularists and the fundamentalist[]” approach to Islamic reformation, but he
also acknowledged that “[m]any Muslims will disagree with An-Na’im’s views,
but the book is a contribution to the continuing debate in the Islamic world.”61

60
61

AN-NA‘IM, supra note 7, at 52–56.
John O. Voll, Foreword to AN-NA‘IM, supra note 7, at xii.
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Conversely, Louay Safi has expressed the view that the concept of reverse naskh
is non-sustainable for three main reasons as follows:
An-Na’im’s proposal seems on its face value to provide a quick
fix to the contradictions between historical shari’a and international
human rights. However, the “evolutionary principle”[] alluded to . . .
is not sustainable, I contend, as it can be easily faulted on both
theoretical and practical grounds. First, since the Qur’an is considered
by Muslims, as An-Na’im himself agrees, as a divine revelation, one
has to accept the totality of the Qur’anic statements to be a single
disclosure. Therefore, one is not justified in abrogating the Madinan
verses altogether on the ground that they address a particular historical
society. Rather one has to eliminate the possibility of generalizing
particular rules by demonstrating their particularity. Such a procedure
would permit one to arrive at the same result without reverting to a
wholesale rejection of on-third of the Qur’an. Secondly, negating the
Madinan Qur’an would not be acceptable by the bulk of Muslims,
including those who agree with An-Na’im that there should be a fresh
reading of the Islamic sources so as to effect a sweeping legal reform.
. . . Thirdly, negating one-third of a book which the majority of
Muslims consider to be incontrovertible is counterproductive,
particularly when it can be shown . . . that the contradictions between
the Makkan and Madinan statements on women and non-Muslims are
more apparent than real, resulting from faulty interpretations by
classical scholars, as well as the application of atomistic
methodologies of derivation.62

Abdulaziz Sachedina has also expressed a similar opinion and has referred
to the fact that some of the Medinan verses are actually compatible with human
rights, noting: “Is not, for example, one of the essential bases for religious
tolerance, ‘there is no compulsion in religion’ (2.256), part of the Medinan
section of the Qur’an?”63 An-Na‘im also acknowledged that this verse was
revealed in Medina but stated that it was revealed in the early Medina period in
contradistinction to verses revealed in the later Medina period, which, he argued,
had sanctioned “the use of varying degrees of coercion on non-Muslims to
induce them to convert to Islam.”64

62
Louay M. Safi, Towards an Islamic Tradition of Human Rights, 18 AM. J. ISLAMIC SOC. SCIS. 16, 19–
20 (2001).
63
Abdulaziz Sachedina, Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na‘im, Toward an Islamic Reformation: Civil Liberties,
Human Rights, and International Law, 25 INT’L J. MIDDLE E. STUD. 155, 156 (1993) (reviewing AN-NA‘IM,
supra note 7).
64
AN-NA‘IM, supra note 7, at 55.
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In my Islamic Law class discussions of An-Na‘im’s philosophy of internal
reformation of Islamic law, the critique, especially from the Muslim students,
has mostly been with respect to two issues, both relating to the nature of Islamic
law. The first one is an issue of terminology, relating to An-Na‘im’s nondistinction between the two terms “shari’ah” and “fiqh” in his analysis of the
nature of Islamic law, while the second one stems from the first issue and relates
to the viability of the concept of reverse naskh as proposed. An-Na‘im’s nondistinction between shari’ah and fiqh stems from his argument that “[t]he
sources and development of Shari’a will show that Shari’a, as known to Muslims
today, is not divine in the sense of being direct revelation[,] [but] the product of
a process of interpretation of, and logical derivation from, the text of the Qur’an
and Sunna and other traditions.”65
Many Islamic scholars support the view that in explaining the nature of
Islamic law, it is necessary to distinguish between shari’ah and fiqh to
differentiate the divine sources of Islamic law from its human jurisprudential
interpretations. Even though the term shari’ah is often used loosely, mostly by
laypersons, for both the divine sources (shari’ah) and its human understanding
(fiqh), the classical Islamic law jurists used the term shari’ah in Islamic legal
theory (usul al-fish) with particular reference to the main sources of Islamic law,
i.e., the Qur’an and the Sunnah, which are divine and textually immutable.
Classical Islamic law jurists’ use of the term is based on the Qur’anic use of the
term as such: “Then We [God] put you [Muhammad] on a pathway [shari’ah]
of the matter, so follow it, and do not follow the whims and desires of those who
do not know.”66
Conversely, the classical jurists used the term fiqh with reference to the
human juristic understanding and interpretation of shari’ah; the fiqh is mutable
and may change according to time and circumstances. The fact that shari’ah
would need to be understood and interpreted through fiqh is reflected in the
Qur’an: “[Those] who listen to [the word (revelation)] and follow [the] best
[interpretation of it; t]hose are the ones God has guided, and those are the people
endowed with insight.”67 In addition, the Qur’an also states, “Follow . . . the best
[interpretation] of what has been revealed to you from your Lord[.]”68 It is
through the medium of fiqh that the jurists transform shari’ah into applied
Islamic law.

65
66
67
68

Id. at 11.
QUR’AN 45:18.
Id. at 39:18.
Id. at 39:55.
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To that end, Baudouin Dupret has noted the following:
References to the Sharia are not frequent in the Quran. In reality, most
classical scholars did not evoke the Sharia and did not claim to know
it, because this would have meant declaring oneself equal to God, thus
committing the capital sin of associationism. Writings on Islamic
normativity, from the ninth century onward, assumed the features of a
particular form known as fiqh.69

Based on their human understandings of the provisions of shari’ah, the classical
jurists compiled fiqh manuals under the different jurisprudential schools. The
fiqh rulings are accepted as law, but unlike shari’ah itself, they are not
immutable. Notably, Islamic law has always been specified in the context of fiqh
by the jurists as reflected in the titles of their different fiqh manuals. Some wellknown examples are al-Jaziri’s al-fiqh ala al-madhahib al-arbaʿah (i.e., fiqh
according to the four jurisprudential schools), Sayyid Sābiq’s fiqh al-sunnah
(i.e., fiqh according to the Sunnah), and Wahbah al-Zuhaylı̄ ’s contemporary alfiqh al-Islāmiyy wa adillatuh (i.e., Islamic jurisprudence and its evidences),
amongst many others. Thus, conflating shari’ah and fiqh often creates confusion
with regard to the question of Islamic law reform. Hammudah ‘Abd al ‘Ati has
noted in that regard that “confusion arises when the term sharī’ah is used
uncritically to designate not only the divine law in its pure principal form, but
also its human subsidiary sciences including fiqh.”70
An-Na‘im himself addressed this contentious point in his 1998 essay titled
Shari’a and Positive Legislation: Is an Islamic State Possible or Viable?, noting
the following:
A distinction is commonly drawn in Islamic discourse between
shari’a and fiqh. As recently explained by Bernard Weiss, “shari’a
law is the product of legislation (shari’a), of which God is the ultimate
subject (shari’). Fiqh law consists of legal understanding, of which the
human being is the subject (faqih).” This distinction can be useful in a
technical sense of indicating that some principles or rules, as compared
to others, are more based on speculative thinking than textual support
from the Qur’an and/or Sunnah. But this does not mean that those
which are taken to be shari’a, rather than fiqh, are the direct product
of revelation because the Qur’an and Sunnah cannot be understood or
have any influence on human behaviour except through the effort of
fallible human beings.71

69
70
71

BAUDOUIN DUPRET, WHAT IS THE SHARIA? 9 (2018).
HAMMŪDAH ‘ABD AL ‘ATI, THE FAMILY STRUCTURE IN ISLAM 14 (1977).
Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na‘im, Shari’a and Positive Legislation: Is an Islamic State Possible or Viable?,
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In appreciating the relevance of the debate on this point, he revisited it again in
Islam and the Secular State, making his view clearer on the point as follows:
In fact, both Shari’a and fiqh [Islamic jurisprudence] are products of
human interpretation of the Qur’an and Sunna of the Prophet in a
particular historical context. Whether a given proposition is said to be
based on Shari’a or fiqh, it is subject to the same risks of human error,
ideological or political bias, or influence[d] by its proponent’s
economic interests and social concerns. . . . Since human interpretation
of relevant texts of the Qur’an and Sunna is unavoidable in both
aspects of this issue, it is difficult to distinguish between the two.72

To avoid speculation about his current view on this point, I raised this
critique with An-Na‘im in my discussion with him, and he reiterated that
distinguishing between shari’ah and fiqh represents a semantic attempt to
explain away the problematic aspects of the relationship between Islam and
human rights and does not really answer the hard questions posed by
international human rights standards to classical Islamic law provisions on
issues such as criminal punishments and discrimination against women and
religious minorities.
Evidently, however, the substantive value of the need for a distinction
between shari’ah and fiqh is that the distinction is at the heart of the general
debate on the internal reform of Islamic law in relation to whether Islamic law
is completely divine and thus can or cannot be reformed. When the term shari’ah
is mentioned, divine revelation is what immediately comes to the mind of most
Muslims; this is why it is imperative to distinguish shari’ah from fiqh, especially
in relation to Islamic law reform. It is apparent from Abou El Fadl’s observation
above73 that many Muslims are opposed to the idea of reforming Islamic law
because they wrongly believe this implies correcting God’s revelation. In
response, Abou El Fadl rightly noted that reform is not about correcting God’s
revelation; rather, it is about improving our understanding of God’s revelation.
In my view, distinguishing between shari’ah and fiqh can be instructive in
separating between God’s actual revelation and our human understanding of
God’s revelation, and help in assuaging the misplaced opposition that many
Muslims have to propositions on the internal reform of Islamic law due to their
misunderstanding of the real object of reform.

5 Y.B. ISLAMIC & MIDDLE E.L. 29, 34 (1998).
72
AN-NA‘IM, supra note 7, at 35.
73
See supra text accompanying note 45.
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The second critique about the viability of the concept of reverse naskh relates
to the complexity and controversy surrounding the scope and concept of naskh
itself in Islamic legal theory. An-Na‘im acknowledged this complexity in his
analysis of the concept of naskh by observing the following:
Naskh is a vast and highly complex subject in Islamic theology
and jurisprudence. At least two types of naskh were accepted by the
majority of Muslim jurists, naskh al-hukm wa al-tilawa (abrogation of
both the ruling and wording of the text) and naskh al-hukm duna tilawa
(abrogation of the ruling but not the wording of the text). . . . [W]e are
concerned with the second type of naskh, in which the text remains
part of the Qur’an but is deemed inoperative for legal purposes.
....
It must be emphasized, however, that whereas the principle of
naskh, in the sense relevant to the present discussion, had already
appeared toward the end of the first century of Isla, its status and role
during the earliest period are not clear.74

Part of the complexities concerning the concept is also that there is no
jurisprudential agreement on the particular list of abrogated verses amongst
Islamic jurists. Also, regarding its nature, some jurists perceive the concept of
naskh as part of the process of divine revelation (shari’ah) by reference to a
specific Qur’anic verse, which states, “Any verse . . . We [God] cause to be
abrogated or forgotten; We will replace it with one like it or better. Do you not
know that God has power over all things?”75 The complexity of the concept of
naskh is reflected in the level of attention and commentary given by Qur’anic
exegetes and jurists to this verse and the concept’s scope of application,
including whether naskh extends to the Sunnah as well. Conversely, other jurists
perceive the concept of naskh as part of the classical jurisprudential process
(fiqh) formulated by the classical jurists as a crucial tool for reconciling
apparently contradictory Qur’anic injunctions.
Where the concept of naskh is perceived or analyzed as part of the process
of divine revelation based on Chapter 2, Verse 106 of the Qur’an, then most
Muslims would oppose the concept of reverse naskh because Qur’anic revelation
stopped with the death of the Prophet and thus the process cannot now be
reversed. However, where the concept is perceived as part of the classical
jurisprudential process (fiqh) formulated by the classical jurists as a crucial tool
for reconciling different Qur’anic verses, then the concept of reverse naskh
would be more tenable to most Muslims as a novel approach for the internal
74
75

AN-NA‘IM, supra note 7, at 57–58.
QUR’AN 2:106.
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reformation of Islamic law as proposed. Citing Ahmad Hasan, An-Na‘im
apparently supports the view that the theory of naskh al-hukm duna tilawa
(abrogation of the ruling but not the wording of the text) was developed and
applied by the classical Islamic jurists as part of their jurisprudential process
(fiqh) and does not reach back to the Prophet’s time.76 Therefore, naskh al-hukm
duna tilawa is distinguishable from shari’ah per se, if the principle of distinction
between shari’ah and fiqh is applied. This discussion again underscores the
importance of distinguishing between shari’ah and fiqh even in arguing for the
concept of reverse naskh as proposed by An-Na‘im.
III. DISCUSSING AN-NA‘IM’S PHILOSOPHY OF RE-AFFIRMING SECULARISM
FOR MUSLIM STATES
The basis of An-Na‘im’s philosophy of re-affirming secularism for Muslim
states is reflected in his confidence that the principles of constitutionalism and
human rights can only be guaranteed by the “secular” state due to its perceived
religious neutrality. This is well reflected in his statement in Islam and the
Secular State:
I am proposing the principles of constitutionalism, human rights, and
citizenship, which can work only when they enjoy sufficient cultural
and religious legitimacy to inspire and motivate people to participate
in organized and sustained political and legal action. An Islamic
discourse is essential for legitimizing the necessary strategies for
regulating the public role of Islam. At the same time, that discourse
cannot emerge or be effective without the security and stability
provided by the secular state.77

This was the opening quotation in my previous essay, and it triggered
discussions in my Human Rights and Islamic Law class about whether the
secular state is really religiously neutral or rather non-religious or even antireligious. Notably, while some scholars opine that neutrality is consistent with
religious liberty, others argue that “properly defined, [neutrality] is often at odds
with religious liberty[,]” and thus is non-religious or even anti-religious.78 Also,
David Cinotti has observed that “neutrality is an indeterminate and vacant idea
because one may always counter neutrality-based arguments by reframing the
definition of neutrality or by making counterarguments also from neutrality.”79
76

See AN-NA‘IM, supra note 7, at 58.
AN-NA‘IM, supra note 8, at 44.
78
Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward Religion, 39 DEPAUL
L. REV. 993, 994–95 (1990).
79
David N. Cinotti, The Incoherence of Neutrality: A Case for Eliminating Neutrality from Religion
77
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He continued, “Despite assertions to the contrary, government decisions toward
religion, either by legislatures or the judiciary, are inevitably directed by the
value judgments of the decisionmakers. Such bias belies the possibility of
government neutrality.”80 Thus, the problem with the traditional concept of the
secular state is that its religious neutrality is contested both in theory and
practice.
It must be acknowledged and emphasized, however, that An-Na‘im’s notion
of the “secular state” in relation to Muslim-majority states is a qualified one
different from the traditional secular state. His conception of the secular state is
contextualized as a truly “neutral,” “pragmatic” secular state that facilitates “an
enabling discourse for promoting the role of Islam in public life[]”81 as opposed
to what he calls “authoritarian secularism”82 that does not allow a role for
religion at all in public life. In my previous essay, I had contextualized this
philosophy by reference mainly to his 2003 essay titled Re-affirming Secularism
for Islamic Societies,83 noting that:
In addressing the issue of Islam versus secularism, An-Na’im
first argues that “[t]he commonly presumed incompatibility between
Islam and secularism needs to be re-evaluated” (p. 36). He observes
that there is both a definitional and terminological as well as
substantive confusion about the presumed incompatibility between
Islam and secularism, which needs to be deconstructed. In trying to
deconstruct the traditional understanding of secularism he argues that
traditional equation of secularism with complete disregard for religion,
or a diminishing role for religion in public life is problematic. He
criticises “the tendency to limit secularism to the experiences of west
European and North American countries with Christianity since the
18th century”, pointing out that in its west European and North
American sense the term secularism “has come to Africa and Asia in
the suspect company of colonialism”. In his view “secularism should
be understood in terms of the type of relationship between religion and
the state, rather than a specific way in which that relationship has
evolved in one society or another”. After that terminological
deconstruction of the concept of secularism, he then proceeds to argue
for the re-affirmation of secularism in Muslim states and proposes that
“the most compelling argument for an Islamic rationale for secularism
is its necessity for pluralistic nation states that are able to safeguard the
freedom of religion and belief of believers and non-believers alike”
Clause Jurisprudence, 45 J. CHURCH & STATE 499, 500 (2003).
80
Id.
81
AN-NA‘IM, supra note 8, at 292–93.
82
Id. at 182.
83
Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na‘im, Re-affirming Secularism for Islamic Societies, 3 NEW PERSPS. 36 (2003).
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(p. 37), meaning that “the freedom of religion and belief of Muslims
as well as non-Muslims is more likely to be violated by a state that
seeks to promote a particular religious doctrine than one that is neutral
on the matter”. He illustrates his points by citing examples of Muslim
intellectuals and political dissidents who have sought refuge in
Western countries “because they enjoy more freedom of belief and
political action in “secular” states that are more or less neutral on
issues of religion” (p. 38). He further argues that the notion of an
Islamic State is a contradiction in terms and that the diversity of
opinion among Islamic schools of thought and scholars makes it
impossible for the state to enact the Shari’a into positive law as that
would lead to the selection of some opinions over others by the state
and consequently deny Muslims the freedom to follow other equally
legitimate Islamic opinions of their choice. In his view, Muslims
actually “need the protection of human rights, and political and social
space secured by secularism to live up to the ideals of their own
religion” and asserts that such “protection and space cannot be
sustained among Muslims without an internal transformation of their
own understandings and practice of Islam” (p. 39). This may be
described as his philosophy of re-affirming secularism for Muslim
states, which I identify as the third element of his general philosophy
on Islam and human rights. It is important to bear in mind An-Na’im’s
redefinition of secularism in this context.
To drive his arguments home, he gives some examples with the
issue of women’s rights in Egypt and of Islamic identify in the Sudan
and Iran to illustrate that a “secular space” is necessary for the
realisation and enjoyment of human rights in Muslim states.84

Considering that (1) he is proffering solutions from within Islam, and (2) he
had earlier asserted, inter alia, that “[a]lthough Muslims presently live with
superficial patterns of western-style government, Muslim belief precludes a
purely secular approach to law and state[,]”85 and that “[a]n Islamic discourse
is essential for legitimizing the necessary strategies for regulating the public role
of Islam[,]”86 one may feel puzzled about An-Na‘im’s specific standpoint on reaffirming secularism for Muslim states. For example, in his review of AnNa‘im’s Islam and the Secular State, Andrew March expressed the view that:
in this book, An-Na’im performs what is not so much an about-face as
a ninety-degree turn. Rather than arguing that Muslims must reform
Islamic law from within so that the laws of Muslim states will enjoy
both compatibility with human rights law and popular legitimacy, An-
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Na’im now argues that Muslim societies ought to endorse something
like American-style secularism, according to which religion may
breath easily in the public sphere and inform public morality but make
no claim to authority over coercive state legislation.87

This conflict may be resolved by the fact that An-Na‘im states clearly that
he is calling for a secular state and not a secular society. He notes that while he
references the secular state and law in his argument, “it is not to advance
Secularism as a life philosophy[.]”88 Rather, he argues, “I am calling for the state
to be secular, not for secularizing society. I argue for keeping the influence of
the state from corrupting the genuine and independent piety of persons in their
communities.”89 He cites earlier Muslim reformist scholars such as Ali Abd
Raziq and Rashid Rida to substantiate his view of the institutional separation of
Islam and the state, which does not necessarily mean that Islam and politics
should be separated. He argues that “[s]eparating Islam and the state while
maintaining the connection between Islam and politics allows for the
implementation of Islamic principles in official policy and legislation[.]”90 Such
contribution would, however, have to be based on “civic reason” and not “solely
on the grounds that they are believed to be part of Shari’a.”91 He explained in
that regard the following:
By a secular state I mean one that is neutral regarding religious
doctrine, one that does not claim or pretend to enforce Shari’a—the
religious law of Islam—simply because compliance with Shari’a
cannot be coerced by fear of state institutions or faked to appease their
officials. This is what I mean by secularism . . . namely, a secular state
that facilitates the possibility of religious piety out of honest
conviction.92

This perspective would not, however, make the proposition less controversial,
especially amongst Muslim scholars. Helen Haste has rightly noted in that regard
that “not all Muslim scholars will fully agree with An-Naʿim’s proposals
regarding the institutional separation of Islam and the state, [but] his thoughts
are a step forward towards a healthy negotiation for the future of Sharia.”93
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Andrew F. March, Islam and the Secular State. By Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na‘im. Harvard University
Press, 2008. 324 pages. $35.00., 79 J. AM. ACAD. RELIGION 258 (2011) (reviewing AN-NA‘IM, supra note 8).
88
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Id. at 1.
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Islam and the Secular State: Negotiating the Future of Shari’a, HARV. UNIV. PRESS, https://www.hup.harvard.
edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674034563&content=reviews (last visited Jan. 15, 2022) (quoting Helen Haste).
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Reflectively, I consider his concept of “civic reason” to be central to his
general philosophy on Islam and human rights, as it apparently links his
philosophy of the internal reformation of Islamic law to his philosophy of reaffirming secularism for Muslim states in relation to the contribution that Islam
can make to the cross-cultural universality of human rights. He elaborates the
concept of “civic reason” as follows:
By civic reason, I mean that the rationale and the purpose of public
policy or legislation must be based on the sort of reasoning that most
citizens can accept or reject. Citizens must be able to make
counterproposals through public debate without being open to charges
about their religious piety. Civic reason and reasoning, and not
personal beliefs and motivations, are necessary whether Muslims
constitute the majority or the minority of the population of the state.
. . . The requirement to present publicly and openly
justifications that are based on reasons which the generality of the
population can freely accept or reject will over time encourage and
develop a broader consensus among the population at large, beyond
the narrow religious or other beliefs of various individuals and
groups.94

He illustrates this by stating that a “Muslim who is arguing that . . . interest (riba)
should be illegal because it is prohibited in Shari’a (haram) may be able to
present some general policy rationale to support the argument that other citizens
can debate, accept, or reject without passing judgment on the religious belief of
that Muslim.”95 The U.N. Human Rights Committee has expressed a similar
perspective in its General Comment 22 on the Freedom of Thought, Conscience
or Religion and General Comment 34 on Freedoms of Opinion and Expression.
Specifically, in restricting any of these rights on grounds of public morals, it
must be noted that “the concept of morals derives from many social,
philosophical and religious traditions; consequently, limitations on the freedom
to manifest a religion or belief for the purpose of protecting morals must be
based on principles not deriving exclusively from a single tradition.”96
Moreover, “[a]ny such limitations must be understood in the light of universality
of human rights and the principle of non-discrimination[.]”97
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With specific reference to his concept of “civic reason” in relation to Islamic
law, the recurring discussion in my Islamic Law class has been that the concept
has the tendency to impose the need for a rational justification of the validity of
Islamic law including the provisions from its divine sources, which, although
appreciated, is not a necessary requirement under classical Islamic legal theory.
To capture his current perspective, I raised this question in my discussion with
An-Na‘im. He reiterated the need not to be held down by traditional Western
understandings of terminologies like “secular,” noting that his notion of the
secular state is not a non-religious or anti-religious state but a state that is neutral
and accommodative of religious norms as earlier analyzed.
The debate about the role of reason and rationalism in Islamic legal theory
has been a contentious one as early as the ninth century in the debates between
the Traditionalists (ahl al-hadith) and Rationalists (ahl al-ra’y), as well as a
principal doctrine of the rationalist Mu’tazilah group. In contemporary legal
theory, Muhammad Abduh is identified as one of the modern advocates of
Islamic law reform who consistently “argued for harmony between sound reason
and revelation, which he thought could never stand in conflict. If there appears
to be a contradiction or conflict between the two, it is because one or the other
has been misunderstood.”98 Oussama Arabi has noted in that regard that Abduh’s
approach was aimed at making “rational thought . . . to have an equal say in
determining the rules governing human relations and social order.”99 But to
sustain that position and make it acceptable within Islamic legal theory, Abduh
made a clear distinction between acts of worship (ibadat) and civil transactions
(mu’amalat). Arabi noted that “this principle applies to the domain of practical
rulings (al ahkam al-amliyya), to the exclusion of the rules of worship (ibadat)
in which Muslims have no licence to deviate from the textual rules of the Qur’an
and Prophetic certified sunna.”100 Similar to the earlier discussion on the need
to distinguish between shari’ah and fiqh as relating to the divine and human
aspects of Islamic law, respectively, Abduh’s distinction between ibadat and
mu’amalat in relation to reason and revelation again underscores the need for
distinction between issues relating to divine aspects and those relating to human
aspects in the theoretical analysis of Islamic law reformation.

98
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CONCLUSION: A CONSISTENT VOICE ON POSSIBLE SYNERGY BETWEEN ISLAM
AND HUMAN RIGHTS
As noted in the quotation at the beginning of this article, there is no doubt
that An-Na‘im is an intellectual giant by all standards, whose “contributions on
the subject span more than three decades [(now more four decades)] during
which he has engaged with almost every topical issue on the subject.”101 A
notable characteristic of his scholarship is the originality, genuineness,
conviction, and tenacity with which he has advanced his thoughts on Islam and
human rights over the past four decades, maintaining a consistent voice on the
possible synergy between the two systems. As noted by Mohammad Fadel,
“[t]hroughout this period he has expressed allegiance to two moral and
intellectual traditions that are typically viewed as in competition if not outright
conflict.”102 I agree with Fadel that An-Na‘im could not have advanced this
position “for so long, however, without genuine dedication to the advancement
of both a universal system of human rights, and the promotion of a religious
conception of Islam that would enable Muslims to endorse the emerging
international human rights regime on terms that would not compromise their
moral integrity.”103
In my previous essay, I contextualized his attempt at finding a synergy
between Islam and human rights by reference again to his article on Re-affirming
Secularism for Islamic Societies:
Based on those three identified elements of his general philosophy of
Islam and human rights, An-Na’im then introduces in this essay, a
theory of “synergy and interdependence” of religion, human rights and
secularism by arguing that: “The synergy and interdependence of
religion and human rights enable Muslims to observe their own
understanding and practice of Islam through an assertion of human
rights, while using their Islamic identity to promote their human rights
within their own Muslim communities. By ensuring that minority and
dissident voices within a religious tradition are able to challenge dated
and regressive understandings and practices of Islam, human rights
and secularism help Muslims avoid the difficult choice of either
rejecting their religion entirely or abandoning their own human rights”
(p. 41). His conclusion in this essay is to the effect that “[m]aintaining
a dynamic synergy and interdependence among human rights, religion
and secularism will enable all citizens to live by their religious
101
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convictions while respecting the right of others to do the same, instead
of expecting people to choose between competing religions or
religious interpretations” (p. 45).104

I also referenced his 2005 article The Interdependence of Religion, Secularism,
and Human Rights: Prospects for Islamic Societies105 in which he emphasized
the interdependence of religion, secularism, and human rights, in relation to
Islamic societies:
[T]he apparent tensions between or among religion, secularism and
human rights “can be overcome by their conceptual synergy” (p. 56).
He notes that he is “not suggesting the collapse of all related ideas,
institutions, and policies into [this] framework” but that his purpose
“is to highlight the dynamics of one complex process that might
contribute to individual freedom and social justice” for all (p. 56).
While he believes that his proposition of synergy was applicable to
various religious and political contexts, his “primary concern as a
Muslim is the prospect for this approach in Islamic societies” and
“would like to encourage the determined promotion – the
strengthening – of this synergy in the interest of legitimizing human
rights, regulating the role of religion in public life, and affirming the
positive place of secularism in Islamic societies” (p. 57).106

In that article, he emphasized the important role of human agency in every
society as well as in his proposed synergic process by arguing that each of the
three paradigms, i.e., religion, secularism, and human rights, is an enabling
factor of human agency and equally susceptible to be influenced by human
agency.107 The question, therefore, is “how to secure the best conditions for
human agency to achieve the transformations required[.]”108 While he noted that
“[h]uman agency is always integral to the interpretation and implementation of
every doctrine[,]” he also acknowledged that “the guardians of orthodoxy
everywhere claim eternal validity for their own interpretation and practice[.]”109
Thus, he argued that it is the principles of human rights that can guarantee the
conditions that will facilitate the atmosphere to challenge such orthodox claims
from within.110 He then analyzed how human rights depend on both secularism
and religion on the one hand, and how religion depends on both secularism and
104
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human rights on the other, and finally how secularism also depends on both
religion and human rights.111 He proceeded to analyze this interdependence in
Islamic contexts with examples again from the issue of women’s rights in Egypt,
and the negotiation of identity and politics in Sudan and in Iran.112 He ended this
article with a strong assertion that “peoples and individuals need make no choice
among religion, secularism, and human rights[.]”113 In his view, “[t]he three can
work in synergy.”114 Therefore he urged “both scholars and policymakers to take
responsibility for that mediation rather than permit further damage to be done
by belief in the incompatibility of religion with secular government and human
rights[,]” a human choice, he argued, that will be made by individuals.115
This brings in the question of who is the actual audience of An-Na‘im’s
philosophy of Islam and Human Rights. Is it the Muslim world? Is it the West?
Is it Muslims wherever they may be? Or is it the world at large? Bearing in mind
that he has emphasized that his scholarship is aimed at realizing social change
on the ground, his intended audience must be primarily the Muslim world and
then, perhaps, Muslims wherever they may be. There was, however, some early
sense of pessimism amongst some Muslim scholars regarding how An-Na‘im’s
approach would be generally received in the Muslim world and by Muslims
generally, as reflected by Sachedina’s observation in 1993:
Na’im’s well-articulated arguments[,] . . . though not without
epistemological problems, are ones that the Islamic religious
leadership in the Arab world needs to hear, if their claim to an “Islamic
solution” for every modern problem is to hold any validity, and the
author will need them to hear it if his framework for reform in the
Islamic world is to receive serious consideration. As it stands, I do not
believe that Na’im’s proposed alternative can carry any implications
beyond the Western academic interest in it, particularly if it remains
inaccessible to the Arabic speaking Sunni Muslim world. A
fundamental prerequisite for advocating a political or social reform
that has the stamp of Islamic legitimacy is to take a serious account of
the realities of the social universe in which these reforms are ultimately
to find actualization.
....
. . . Nevertheless, Na’im’s work is bound to stimulate much
debate, at least, among the Muslims in the West who are searching for
new intellectual strategies to interact with their inherited normative
111
112
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tradition in order fully to integrate into the non-Muslim social
universe. It is certainly a welcome addition to our growing awareness
of the challenges facing modern educated Muslim intellectuals. It also
serves as a reminder to many of us who are engaged in making Islam
intelligible to the West in general and to our Western academic
colleagues in particular that we are engaged in two levels of religious
discourse: one allows us to speak to the “insiders,”—that is, the
community of the believers—and the second allows us to
communicate intellectually with the “outsiders,” the “others.”
Professor Na’im’s religious discourse, as the conclusion states, is
directed towards the “insiders,” using a methodology that would be
regarded by them as questionable. By depending on preconceived
interpretations of Islamic tradition in the secondary sources in English,
Na’im will, I believe, alienate many of the “insiders” who need to take
seriously his advocacy for long overdue reform.116

Since then, however, Toward an Islamic Reformation has been published in
three other major languages, making it more accessible to non-English language
speakers in the Muslim world. It was first published in Arabic in 1994, then in
Indonesian in 1995, and in Farsi in 2003. Apart from these three major languages
of the Muslim world, it was also published in Russian language in 1999.
Conversely, Fadel has noted the following with regard to Islam and the Secular
State:
One group of critics has already expressed their scepticism of
Na’im’s Islamic arguments, suggesting they are insufficiently
grounded in Islamic revelation to be taken seriously by Muslims. I too
have my own doubts regarding the Islamic plausibility of Na’im’s
arguments, but not because they are insufficiently grounded in Islamic
revelation. Indeed, in some ways Na’im is also a scripturalist: he
argues against the normativity of the Islamic tradition in favor of
continuous individual interpretations of revelation.
....
Despite my dissatisfaction with the Islamic justification Na’im
provides for his version of secularism, . . . I believe Na’im makes very
persuasive practical arguments in favor of a secular state that will
appeal to many religious Muslims who are simply seeking a way to
live their lives as more or less traditional Muslims within the
framework of a modern nation state.117

As I stated in my previous essay, whether or not one agrees with every aspect
of An-Na‘im’s three-angled philosophy on Islam and human rights and his
116
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theory of interdependence, “there is no doubt that he is a great scholar whose
views make significant contributions to human rights discourse generally and to
the topic of Islam and human rights particularly.”118 “The factual point is that
the questions he raises and engages with regarding the relationship between
Islam and human rights in the modern world generally and in modern Muslim
states particularly are very valid and complex questions, which he himself
acknowledges could be addressed from many different perspectives.”119 “He
states, for example, . . . that ‘I am not suggesting the collapse of all related ideas,
institutions, and policies into the framework I am describing. My purpose . . . is
to highlight the dynamics of one complex process that might contribute to
individual freedom and social justice[.]’”120 And there is no doubt that his
scholarship has continued to influence or, at least, forms part of the ongoing
debate on how to balance the relationship between Islam, human rights, and the
secular state in the Muslim world today.
I venture to conclude that in trying to find possible synergy between Islam,
human rights, and the secular state, An-Na‘im’s scholarship has turned full circle
on this complex subject. While his earlier book Toward an Islamic Reformation
established his perspective on the need for internal Islamic reformation, his
Islam and the Secular State can be described as an academic balancing act, in
the preface of which he insinuated that he would be casing his pen when stating
that the book was “the culmination of [his] life’s work, the final statement [he]
wish[ed] to make on issues [he has] been struggling with since [he] was a student
at the University of Khartoum, Sudan, in the late 1960s.”121 But as these
persistent issues are continually subjected to academic debate, he could
obviously not resist the temptation to uncase his pen again to write his most
current book Decolonizing Human Rights, which establishes his perspective on
the need to decolonize human rights to make it inclusively universal.122 With his
scholarship having obviously turned full circle, one may rightly and expectantly
ask, what next in the law should we expect from this academic giant?
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